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The Synergistic Evolution of Liberty and 
Equality in the Marriage Cases Brought by 
Same-Sex Couples in State Courts 
Jean C. Love* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars have expressed varying views about the role of liberty 
and equality in gay rights litigation. For example, in 1988, Professor Cass 
Sunstein took the position that the Due Process Clause is “backward-
looking,” protecting “traditional practices against short-run departures.”1 By 
contrast, he said that the Equal Protection Clause “looks forward, serving to 
invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification.”2 
Therefore, he encouraged gay rights litigators to lead with equality. In 2000, 
Professor William Eskridge challenged Sunstein’s thesis. He examined the 
text and the history of the two clauses and concluded that both clauses are 
simultaneously present-looking, forward-looking, and backward-looking.3 
Consequently, he took the position that the two clauses ought to be 
distinguished on the basis of their function.4 In the context of gay rights 
litigation, he suggested that plaintiffs’ lawyers should rely first on the Due 
Process Clause (particularly in its more procedural aspects) for making 
disruptive challenges to statutes at the “retail level.”5 Only later should they 
invoke “evolutive equal protection” for making broad facial challenges to 
statutes at the “wholesale level.”6 More recently, Professor Kenji Yoshino 
encouraged gay rights litigators to lead with liberty on the theory that the 
recognition of liberty for all will serve to advance both liberty and equality.7
 
* John A. and Elizabeth H. Sutro Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I dedicate this Article to 
my spouse, Patricia A. Cain. 
 
Finally, a fourth legal scholar, Professor Pamela Karlan, has suggested that 
 1. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship 
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163, 1171 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 1163. 
 3. William N. Eskridge, Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1185–86, 1218–19 (2000).  
 4. Id. at 1186–87.  
 5. Id. at 1186. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Kenji Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 961, 969–70 (2007).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596171
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“sometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses of both 
the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have synergistic 
effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.”8
This Article will examine selected marriage cases brought by same-sex 
couples in state courts in order to understand the role played by liberty and 
equality in this one segment of gay rights litigation. At first, neither liberty 
nor equality could dent the definition of marriage as an institution designed 
exclusively for opposite-sex couples.
 In other 
words, Professor Karlan’s theory would suggest that sometimes gay rights 
litigators ought to lead with both liberty and equality simultaneously.  
9 But gradually, over time, the interplay 
between the claims of liberty and equality began to alter the state courts’ 
understanding of the institution of marriage.10
This evolutionary process has not been linear. Instead, the courts have 
typically taken two steps forward
 It is the thesis of this Article 
(written with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight) that, by focusing on the two 
constitutional issues simultaneously, gay rights litigators in the state court 
marriage cases have sparked a synergistic evolution of both liberty and 
equality under state constitutional law.  
11 and one step back.12 At times, the liberty 
claim and the equality claim have been in tension with one another.13 At 
other times, the two claims have complemented each other.14
This Article will trace the synergistic evolution of liberty and equality 
in the state court marriage cases brought by same-sex couples. Its primary 
purpose is to demonstrate the effectiveness of advancing the two claims 
simultaneously when state constitutions are at issue. At the same time, gay 
rights litigators in federal court marriage equality cases
 Yet, at all 
times, the interplay between the two claims has challenged the judiciary to 
rethink the fundamental question of whether marriage is an exclusive 
institution for opposite-sex couples only.  
15
Finally, a subsidiary purpose of this Article is to parse and compare the 
holdings in the key state court marriage equality cases in order to identify 
 may be interested 
in this Article as well because the assertion of the two claims simultaneously 
in the federal forum might spark a second, synergistic evolution of liberty 
and equality under the Federal Constitution.  
 
 8. Pamela Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002). 
 9. See, e.g., infra notes 17–33 and accompanying text.  
 10. See, e.g., infra notes 47–60 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., infra notes 154–236 and accompanying text. 
 12. See, e.g., infra notes 237–307 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 34–89 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., infra notes 308–59 and accompanying text. 
 15. E.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV09-2292 (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 2009), available 
at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/legal-filings/plaintiffs-filed-complaint/. 
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each step in the process by which the courts gradually moved toward the 
extension of marriage to same-sex couples. Parsing and comparing the 
holdings is complicated by the fact that there is a split of opinion among the 
justices in most of the cases under review. The phenomenon of fractured 
courts in the state court marriage cases finally came to an end when the Iowa 
Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion extending marriage to same-sex 
couples in Varnum v. Brien.16
II.  BAKER V. NELSON: LIBERTY AND EQUALITY WITH NO SYNERGY 
  
In the first marriage equality case, Baker v. Nelson,17 a male couple 
claimed in state court that Minnesota’s opposite-sex marriage statute denied 
the plaintiffs both liberty and equality under the Federal Constitution. More 
specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that “the right to marry without regard to 
the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons,” and that 
“restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is irrational and 
invidiously discriminatory.”18 In essence, the plaintiffs were asking the court 
to look at the marriage issue stereoscopically. They were challenging the 
sex-based classification in the marriage statute as a denial of equal 
protection, and simultaneously, they were inviting the court to broaden the 
scope of the fundamental right to marry by defining that liberty interest 
without regard to the sex of the parties. The plaintiffs were basing their 
claim upon Loving v. Virginia,19
With regard to liberty, the Court in Loving declared: “The freedom to 
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
 a case that the United States Supreme Court 
had decided three years earlier, in which the Court struck down Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation statute under both the Due Process and the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution.  
20 The Court further 
recognized the freedom to marry as the right to marry a person of one’s 
choice, and the Court characterized marriage as one of the “basic civil rights 
of man.”21 But when the plaintiffs in Baker v. Nelson asserted that they had 
a fundamental right to marry, the Minnesota Supreme Court balked.22
 
 16. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 It 
ignored the definition of marriage in Loving and relied instead on a very 
traditional definition of marriage: “The institution of marriage, as a union of 
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children 
 17. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 18. Id. at 186. 
 19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 20. Id. at 12. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
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within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”23 Because the plaintiffs 
(as a couple) could not procreate, the court rejected their liberty claim 
outright, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause is “not a charter for 
restructuring [marriage] by judicial legislation.”24
With regard to equality, the Court in Loving applied strict scrutiny to 
strike down a race-based classification.
  
25 Yet, when the plaintiffs in Baker v. 
Nelson alleged that the Minnesota statute contained a sex-based 
classification that also ought to be stricken under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Minnesota Supreme Court once again balked.26 The court 
accepted the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute contained a facial sex-based 
classification, but it applied deferential low-level scrutiny and held that there 
was “no irrational or invidious discrimination.”27
The plaintiffs contended that the means were in fact not rationally 
related to the State’s objective of promoting procreation because the statute 
did not require opposite-sex couples to prove their capacity and willingness 
to procreate as a condition of obtaining a marriage license.
  
28 The court 
responded that “‘abstract symmetry’ is not demanded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”29 In a footnote, the court further observed that the Equal 
Protection Clause “does not require things which are different in fact or 
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.”30 The court 
thereby suggested that same-sex couples are not similarly situated to 
opposite-sex couples for purposes of marriage under the Equal Protection 
Clause because they are unable to procreate. The court then distinguished 
Loving on the ground that “in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, 
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon 
race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”31
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the opposite-sex marriage 
statute did not violate the Federal Constitution.
   
32 The United States Supreme 
Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal for want of a substantial federal 
question.33
 
 23. Id. 
 In the beginning, then, the ability to procreate defined the scope 
of the right to marry, and the inability of same-sex couples to procreate 
 24. Id. 
 25. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.   
 26. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (quoting Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1914)). 
 30. Id. at 187 n.4. 
 31. Id. at 187. 
 32. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
 33. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
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justified their exclusion from the institution of marriage under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Neither a liberty claim nor an equality claim was strong 
enough to overcome the power of the traditional definition of marriage, and 
advancing the two claims simultaneously sparked absolutely no synergy 
whatsoever.  
III.  BAEHR V. LEWIN: LIBERTY AND EQUALITY WITH A HINT OF SYNERGY 
When same-sex couples renewed their commitment to the fight for 
marriage equality two decades later, they sought to avoid the adverse impact 
of Baker v. Nelson34 by filing their complaints in state courts and alleging 
violations of state constitutions. In the first such case, Baehr v. Lewin,35 the 
plaintiffs (three same-sex couples) alleged a denial of both liberty and 
equality under the Hawaii Constitution.36 The Hawaii Supreme Court had a 
tradition of looking first to federal law when interpreting the state 
constitution, but it also was willing to construe the state constitution 
independently of the Federal Constitution.37
With regard to the liberty claim in Baehr, the plaintiffs asked the court 
to recognize a “new fundamental right,” namely, “a right to same-sex 
marriage.”
 
38 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the court chose to construe the 
State’s due process clause in accord with the Federal Constitution.39 
Moreover, the court chose to interpret the Federal Constitution in keeping 
with Professor Sunstein’s theory that the Due Process Clause is “backward-
looking,” protecting fundamental rights that are rooted in tradition.40 When 
the court examined the relevant United States Supreme Court opinions,41 it 
found a “link” between the right to marry and the right to procreate.42 
Consequently, the court concluded that the “federal construct of the 
fundamental right to marry . . . presently contemplates unions between men 
and women.”43
 
 34. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 Turning to the issue before it, the court said that the question 
was “whether we will hold that same-sex couples possess a fundamental 
 35. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 36. Id. at 50. 
 37. Id. at 57. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 55. 
 40. See Sunstein, supra note 1. 
 41. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55–56.  
 42. Id. at 56. 
 43. Id. 
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right to marry.”44
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted 
in the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure 
to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex 
marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.
 Not surprisingly, given the framing of the issue, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ liberty claim outright for the following reasons:  
45
Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not have a fundamental 




With regard to the equality claim, the plaintiffs asked the court to rule 
that the State’s ban on same-sex marriage violated Hawaii’s equal protection 
clause, which provides in relevant part: “No person shall . . . be denied equal 
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil 
rights . . . because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.”
   
47 Fortunately for the 
plaintiffs, the court chose to construe the State’s equal protection clause 
independently of the Federal Constitution on the ground that the text of the 
State’s equal protection clause is not a mirror image of the Federal 
Constitution.48 Moreover, the court chose to construe the state constitution 
in accord with Professor Sunstein’s theory that an equal protection clause is 
generally forward-looking.49
The first question that arose under the State’s equal protection clause 
was whether marriage is a civil right.
   
50 After consulting a dictionary, a 
plurality of the court (later to become a majority) announced that “civil 
rights” are “civil liberties,” which in turn may be defined as “[p]ersonal, 
natural rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.”51 The plurality 
then held that marriage is a civil right.52
 
 44. Id. at 57. 
 The plurality supported its holding 
by quoting the following sentence from the due process section of Loving v. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 48. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. 
 49. That is, through an equality claim, a disadvantaged group may ask a court to examine the 
effect of a traditional practice (such as opposite-sex marriage) and eliminate the adverse impact of 
that traditional practice on currently disadvantaged groups (such as same-sex couples). See supra 
note 2 and accompanying text. 
 50. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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Virginia:53 “‘The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
[people].’”54 The plurality went on to say: “So ‘fundamental’ does the 
United States Supreme Court consider the institution of marriage that it has 
deemed marriage to be ‘one of the “basic civil rights of [men and 
women].”’”55
The two dissenting judges, who had joined the plurality in rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ liberty claim, criticized the plurality for ruling that there is a 
“‘civil right’ to a same sex marriage” under the State’s equal protection 
clause.
   
56 From the dissenters’ point of view, the plurality’s ruling was 
inconsistent with the court’s holding that there was no fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage under the State’s due process clause.57 The plurality 
responded by saying that it had “not held” that the plaintiffs “have a ‘civil 
right’ to a same sex marriage,” but rather, it had simply “noted that the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized for over fifty years that 
marriage is a basic civil right.”58 From the plurality’s standpoint, the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that marriage is a civil right was at least 
“relevant” to a proper interpretation of the State’s equal protection clause.59
This is the moment when one can begin to see a hint of the synergistic 
evolution of liberty and equality in Baehr. Even though the Hawaii Supreme 
Court was not willing to hold that the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage under the State’s due process clause, the plurality was 
willing to find that marriage is a “civil right” under the State’s equal 
protection clause.
   
60
The second question under Hawaii’s equal protection clause was 
whether the opposite-sex marriage statute denied the plaintiffs the enjoyment 
of the civil right of marriage because of sex. The plaintiffs had alleged, and 
the defendant’s amended answer had admitted, that the State denied the 
plaintiffs’ applications for marriage licenses on the ground that “each couple 
 The plurality took the concept that marriage is a “civil 
right” directly from the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of 
“liberty” in Loving. Linguistically, defining marriage as a “civil right” for 
purposes of the equal protection clause permitted the plurality to shift its 
focus from the “link” between marriage and procreation to the “link” 
between marriage and the pursuit of happiness.   
 
 53. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 54. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 70 (Heen, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.   
282 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [13:2010] 
was of the same sex.”61 Based on these pleadings, the plurality took the 
position that the statute, both “on its face” and “as applied,” regulated access 
to the status of marriage on the basis of the applicant’s sex.62
The dissenting judges chose to focus not on the defendant’s amended 
answer, but rather on his answering brief, with which they agreed.
  
63 The 
defendant’s answering brief took the position that the plaintiffs were not 
denied marriage licenses “because of their sex,” but rather because of their 
“biologic inability as a couple to satisfy the definition of the status to which 
they aspire.”64 Put another way, the defendant argued that “the right of 
persons of the same sex to marry one another does not exist because 
marriage, by definition and usage, means a special relationship between a 
man and a woman.”65 In effect, the defendant contended that same-sex 
couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples for purposes of 
marriage because they are unable to procreate. The plurality rejected the 
defendant’s argument on the grounds that it was not only “circular and 
unpersuasive,”66 but also an “exercise in tortured and conclusory 
sophistry.”67 The plurality was able to dismiss the defendant’s argument so 
decisively because it had held that marriage is a “civil right,” thereby linking 
marriage to the pursuit of happiness (rather than to procreation).68
The concurring judge thought that the statute, which distinguished 
between “same-sex couples” and “opposite-sex couples,” might be found to 
contain a sexual orientation-based classification that would be the equivalent 
of a sex-based classification (provided the plaintiffs could submit proof at 
trial that sexual orientation is “biologically fated”).
  
69 The plurality disagreed 
because it opined that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples was 
not the same as denying marriage licenses to homosexuals.70 Furthermore, 
the plurality took the position that the statute did not contain a facial sexual 
orientation-based classification.71
 
 61. Id. at 50. 
 The plurality based its position on the 
following line of reasoning: “Parties to ‘a union between a man and a 
woman’ may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage 
 62. Id. at 60. 
 63. Id. at 70–71, 73 (Heen, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 60–61 (plurality opinion).  
 65. Id. at 61. 
 66. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61. 
 67. Id. at 63.  
 68. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 69. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69–70 (Burns, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 52 n.11 (plurality opinion). 
 71. Id. 
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could theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals.”72
The dissenters also took the position that the text of the statute did not 
facially discriminate on the basis of sex because it applied equally to both 
men and women.
 The two 
dissenting judges agreed with the plurality that the text of the statute did not 
facially discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.  
73 Women could not marry women, and men could not 
marry men.74 In other words, the dissenting judges would have recognized 
the equal application defense.75 The plurality disagreed, taking the position 
that Loving expressly rejected the equal application defense in the context of 
a challenge to an anti-miscegenation statute containing a race-based 
classification. Consequently, the plurality concluded by way of analogy that 
it was free to reject the equal application defense in the context of a 
challenge to an opposite-sex marriage statute containing a sex-based 
classification.76
The plurality knew that, under the Federal Equal Protection Clause, sex-
based classifications are subject to intermediate-level scrutiny.
 
77 But 
Hawaii’s equal rights amendment provides: “Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex.”78 Therefore, 
the issue before the court was whether the equal rights amendment required 
the application of intermediate-level scrutiny or strict scrutiny to a sex-based 
classification. The plurality ruled: “In light of . . . the presence of article I, 
section 3—the Equal Rights Amendment—in the Hawaii Constitution, . . . 
we hold that sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal protection 
analysis under article I, section 5 . . . and that [the marriage statute] is 
subject to the ‘strict scrutiny’ test.”79
The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment for the 
defendant on the pleadings and remanded the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with the plurality opinion.
   
80
 
 72. Id.  
 The defendant 
moved for reconsideration or clarification because the court had split 
 73. Id. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 72. 
 76. Id. at 68 (plurality opinion).  
 77. Id. at 64 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). 
 78. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 79. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. Earlier cases in Hawaii had avoided the issue of whether “sex” 
should be treated as a “suspect classification” under the state constitution. See, e.g., Holdman v. 
Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Haw. 1978) (holding that the court did not need to reach the issue of 
whether sex was a suspect category because a prison rule requiring female visitors to wear brassieres 
would have satisfied the compelling state interest test under strict scrutiny).  
 80. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
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regarding its interpretation of the equal protection clause.81 At the time of 
the hearing on the defendant’s motion, one of the two dissenting judges had 
been replaced by a judge who was willing to support the plurality opinion.82
On remand, the trial court applied strict scrutiny to the sex-based 
classification.
 
This change in the composition of the court effectively turned the plurality 
opinion into a majority opinion.  
83 It found that the statute was unconstitutional because the 
State had “failed to present sufficient credible evidence which demonstrates 
that the public interest in the well-being of children and families . . . would 
be adversely affected by same-sex marriage.”84 The trial court then issued an 
injunction prohibiting the State from denying an application for a marriage 
license solely because the applicants were of the same sex.85
The State obtained a stay of the injunction pending its appeal of the 
case.
  
86 Before the Hawaii Supreme Court could consider that appeal, 
however, the people of Hawaii voted to adopt a constitutional amendment 
that gave the legislature the exclusive authority to define marriage in the 
State of Hawaii.87 The legislature chose to define marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman.88
Baehr is a case in which there was an incredible tension between the 
liberty claim and the equality claim. Under the “backward-looking” liberty 
theory, the Hawaii Supreme Court (like the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Baker v. Nelson) found that the fundamental right to marry under the Federal 
Constitution was inextricably linked to the right to procreate. Because the 
court chose to construe the state constitutional right to liberty in accord with 
the Federal Constitution, the plaintiffs could not mount a successful 
challenge to the marriage statute under the State’s due process clause.  
 Thus, within the context of a single 
case, the evolution of marriage equality had moved two steps forward and 
one giant step back.   
When the Hawaii Supreme Court turned its attention to the unique text 
of the State’s equal protection clause (prohibiting the denial of “civil rights” 
on the basis of sex), the court chose to construe the state constitution 
 
 81. Id. at 74 (2–1–2 decision). 
 82. Id. at 74–75. See also Nancy Klingeman & Kenneth May, Recent Development, For 
Better or for Worse, in Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex 
Marriage in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 447, 480 (1994). 
 83. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *19 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
 84. Id. at *21. 
 85. Id. at *22. 
 86. See David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of 
Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1997).  
 87. The Hawaii Constitution, article 1, section 23, provides that “[t]he legislature shall have 
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” 
 88. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2009). The legislature recognized only 
reciprocal beneficiary status for same-sex couples. Id. § 572C-4. 
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independently of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the court was free 
to depart from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. Nelson that 
the inability of same-sex couples to procreate justified their exclusion from 
the institution of marriage under the Federal Equal Protection Clause. The 
questions before the court under the State’s equal protection clause were 
whether marriage is a “civil right” and, if so, whether same-sex couples 
could justifiably be excluded from the institution of marriage as so defined.  
In concluding that marriage is a “civil right,” the Hawaii Supreme Court 
relied on the due process section of Loving, in which the United States 
Supreme Court characterized marriage as a “basic civil right” that is 
“essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.”89
IV.  BAKER V. STATE: EQUAL BENEFITS WITHOUT EQUAL STATUS 
 This is the moment when 
the court recognized a hint of synergy between liberty and equality in Baehr. 
Once the court had linked marriage to the pursuit of happiness (rather than to 
procreation), it was in a position to reject the defendant’s argument that 
same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples for 
purposes of marriage because of their inability to procreate. That ruling then 
set the stage for the court to become the first state high court to announce 
that the classification in an opposite-sex marriage statute is a sex-based, 
suspect classification that is not vulnerable to the equal application defense 
and that must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Needless to say, if the State’s 
equal protection clause had not explicitly protected “civil rights,” and if the 
court had not recognized the synergy between liberty and equality in 
construing the phrase “civil rights,” the case might have come out very 
differently, given that the court was so severely splintered.  
The second major marriage equality case to be brought under a state 
constitution was Baker v. State.90 The plaintiffs were same-sex couples who 
claimed that Vermont’s opposite-sex marriage statute violated several 
provisions of the state constitution.91 The Vermont Supreme Court chose to 
focus exclusively on the common benefits clause, which provides: “That 
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, 
and security of the people, nation, or community; and not for the particular 
emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who 
are a part only of that community . . . .”92 The clause promotes the principle 
of equality, although technically it is neither an equal protection clause nor 
an equal rights amendment.93
 
 89. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
  
 90. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
 91. Id. at 870 n.2. 
 92. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7. 
 93. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 870–71. 
286 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [13:2010] 
Early in its opinion, the Vermont Supreme Court discussed the 
historical origins of the common benefits clause. The clause was originally 
designed to prevent the establishment of the equivalent of British royalty, 
but the court found that the American Revolution had also “tapped deep-
seated domestic antagonisms” against such groups as “New Yorkers 
claiming Vermont lands.”94 Consequently, the court concluded that the 
common benefits clause was not “principally concerned with civil rights for 
African-Americans and other minorities,” but rather with “access to public 
benefits and protections for the community as a whole.”95
Given the historical origins of the common benefits clause, the Vermont 
Supreme Court announced that, when analyzing laws challenged under the 
clause, it would apply a relatively uniform standard of non-deferential, low-
level scrutiny (rather than the multi-tiered analysis developed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment).
 
96 It described its test for low-level scrutiny under 
the common benefits clause as “broadly deferential to the legislative 
prerogative to define and advance governmental ends, while vigorously 
ensuring that the means chosen bear a just and reasonable relation to the 
governmental objective.”97 The court also explained that it would consider 
three factors when applying its test for low-level scrutiny: “(1) the 
significance of the benefits . . . of the challenged law; (2) whether the 
omission of members of the community from the benefits . . . of the 
challenged law promotes the government’s stated goals; and (3) whether the 
classification is significantly underinclusive or overinclusive.”98
In considering the first factor, the Vermont Supreme Court examined 
the significance of civil marriage under the common benefits clause.
 
99 The 
court followed in the footsteps of Baehr v. Lewin100 by noting that, in the 
due process section of Loving v. Virginia,101 the United States Supreme 
Court observed that “‘[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as 
one of the vital personal rights.’”102 The court therefore concluded that the 
multitude of benefits and obligations that flow from civil marriage 
“significantly enhance the quality of life in our society.”103
This is the moment when one can begin to see a hint of synergy 
  
 
 94. Id. at 875.  
 95. Id. at 876.  
 96. Id. at 877–78.  
 97. Id. at 871. 
 98. Id. at 879. 
 99. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 883. 
 100. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
 101. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 102. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 883 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12). 
 103. Id. 
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between liberty and equality in Baker v. State. The court had defined the 
“common benefit” of marriage by reference to the definition of the 
fundamental right to marry in Loving. Therefore, the court was prepared to 
focus throughout the remainder of its opinion on the link between marriage 
and the pursuit of happiness, rather than on the link between marriage and 
procreation.  
Having established the significance of the benefits at issue under the 
common benefits clause, the court next considered the nature of the 
classification that excluded the plaintiffs from access to those benefits. The 
majority announced in a single sentence that the marriage statute excluded 
“anyone who wishe[d] to marry someone of the same sex.”104 The 
concurring judge explained in greater detail that, although the marriage 
statute did “not facially discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,” 
there could be “no doubt” that the statute had “the effect of discriminating 
against lesbian and gay couples . . . who [were] unable to marry the life 
partners of their choice.”105 Because the court had chosen to focus on the 
link between marriage and the pursuit of happiness, it was the first state high 
court to understand that the classification at issue was in effect a sexual 
orientation-based classification.106
The Vermont Supreme Court was aware of the fact that the Hawaii 
Supreme Court had found a facial sex-based classification in Baehr, but the 
court disagreed with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s analysis. The court 
thought that the Vermont marriage statute was “facially neutral” with regard 
to gender because it did not “single out men or women as a class for 
disparate treatment.”
   
107 Rather, it prohibited both “men and women equally 
from marrying a person of the same sex.”108 In other words, the court 
permitted the State to assert the equal application defense in response to the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the statute contained a sex-based classification.109 The 
court distinguished Loving on the ground that, in Loving, the United States 
Supreme Court had found evidence that the legislature’s “real purpose was 
to maintain the pernicious doctrine of white supremacy.”110 The court could 
find no evidence of a comparably pernicious legislative motive to maintain 
male supremacy.111
 
 104. Id. at 880. 
 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence 
demonstrated a discriminatory purpose, the court said:  
 105. Id. at 890.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 880 n.13.  
 108. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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It is one thing to show that long-repealed marriage statutes 
subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is quite 
another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws 
excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect and discriminatory 
assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role 
confusion.112
The court concluded that, in the absence of the latter type of evidence, the 




One judge, Judge Johnson, dissented in part with regard to the 
classification issue.
  
114 She emphasized the fact that the statute did not 
classify facially on the basis of sexual orientation, and she stated her opinion 
that “this is a straightforward case of sex discrimination.”115 Furthermore, 
she took the position that the sex-based classification ought to trigger 
heightened scrutiny under the common benefits clause.116 She found that the 
equal application defense did not apply because marriage is an individual 
right, not a group right.117 She also expressed her opinion that the sex-based 
classification in the Vermont marriage statute was a “vestige of sex-role 
stereotyping.”118 She acknowledged that the sex-role stereotyping at issue 
harmed both men and women,119 but she thought that the common benefits 
clause precluded the State from continuing to give “credence to generally 
discredited sex-role stereotyping.”120
Once the Vermont Supreme Court had determined that the classification 
at issue was in effect a sexual-orientation based classification, its third task 
was to consider whether the classification was justifiable under its test of 
non-deferential, low-level scrutiny. More specifically, the court had to 
determine whether the State could prove a “legitimate public purpose”
   
121 for 
the sexual orientation-based classification and, if so, whether the State could 
show that the means “reasonably relate[d]” to that end.122
 
 112. Id. 
 It should be noted 
that the Vermont Supreme Court was the first state high court to consider the 
 113. Id. 
 114. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 904–05 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 905. 
 117. Id. at 906. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 907 n.11. 
 121. Id. at 871 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id.  
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question of whether the state had established an adequate justification for a 
denial of marriage equality under a state constitution. Perhaps that is what 
motivated the State to advance such a dizzying array of justifications for its 
opposite-sex marriage statute.123 The court seriously considered only two of 
them.124
First, the Vermont Supreme Court focused on the State’s argument that 
the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage promotes 
procreation and furthers “the link between procreation and child rearing,” 
which serves to ensure that the offspring of opposite-sex couples “are 
considered legitimate and receive ongoing parental support.”
  
125 The court 
acknowledged that these are valid public interests and that the overwhelming 
majority of births in Vermont result from natural conception.126 However, it 
also noted that many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to 
procreation.127 Moreover, married opposite-sex couples who are incapable 
of having children through natural conception may either adopt children or 
utilize assisted-reproductive techniques.128 Therefore, the court found that 
“if the purpose of the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples is to ‘further[] 
the link between procreation and child rearing,’ then it is significantly 
underinclusive.”129 Furthermore, the court found that the exclusion of same-
sex couples with children from the institution of marriage “exposes their 
children to the precise risks that the State argues the marriage laws are 
designed to secure against,” thereby making the statutory exclusion of all 
same-sex couples significantly over-inclusive.130 In other words, the court 
said, the statutory exclusion of all same-sex couples “treats persons who are 
similarly situated for purposes of the law, differently,” and for this reason the 
court found that the means were not reasonably related to the end.131
Second, the State argued that, “because same-sex couples cannot 
conceive a child on their own, their exclusion [from marriage] promotes a 
‘perception of the link between procreation and child rearing,’ and that to 
discard [the perception] would ‘advance the notion that mothers and 





 123. Id. at 881, 884–85.  
 The court found that, even if sending a public message about 
 124. Id. at 881. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 881. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 882. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 882. 
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the link between procreation and child-rearing is a legitimate governmental 
objective, nevertheless the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is a 
grossly under-inclusive means to that end.133 The court noted that most of 
the people who use assisted-reproductive techniques are “infertile married 
couples.”134 The court further noted that the State had never suggested that a 
married couple’s use of assisted-reproductive techniques would undermine 
anyone’s sense of parental responsibility.135 Nor had the State taken any 
steps to restrict access to such techniques as a matter of public policy.136 
Consequently, there was no reasonable basis to conclude that a same-sex 
couple’s use of assisted-reproductive technologies would undermine 
society’s perception of the link between procreation and child-rearing.137
Having determined that the plaintiffs had been unconstitutionally 
denied the benefits of marriage in violation of the common benefits clause, 
the Vermont Supreme Court turned to the question of what would be an 
appropriate remedy. The plaintiffs had sought declaratory relief and an 
injunction prohibiting the State from denying marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.
 
138 The court observed, however, that the plaintiffs’ claims and their 
arguments on appeal had focused primarily on the consequences of being 
excluded from “the statutory benefits, protections, and security incident to 
marriage under Vermont law.”139 Therefore, the court decided to hold 
“only” that the plaintiffs were entitled to obtain “the [statutory] benefits and 
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples.”140 
The court then left it up to the legislature to craft “an appropriate means of 
addressing this constitutional mandate.”141 The court suggested that the 
legislature could extend marriage to same-sex couples, but it also indicated 
that the legislature could create an alternative status for same-sex couples, 
such as domestic partnerships.142
 
 133. Id. at 882–83.  
 The court retained jurisdiction over the 
case, stating: “In the event that the benefits and protections in question are 
not statutorily granted, plaintiffs may petition this Court to order the remedy 
 134. Id. at 882. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 886. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 886–87. The court fully understood that such an “alternative status” might itself be 
the subject of a future constitutional challenge: “While some future case may attempt to establish 
that—notwithstanding equal benefits and protections under Vermont law—the denial of a marriage 
license operates per se to deny constitutionally-protected rights, that is not the claim we address 
today.” Id. at 886. 
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they originally sought.”143
Judge Johnson, dissenting in part, objected to the majority’s “novel and 
truncated remedy.”
  
144 She took the position that it is “not only the 
prerogative but the duty of courts to provide prompt relief for violations of 
individual civil rights.”145 She stated her opinion that this principle ensures 
that “laws enacted through the will of the majority do not unconstitutionally 
infringe upon the rights of a disfavored minority.”146 Since the majority had 
found that the plaintiffs were entitled to those benefits and protections 
afforded under Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples, she suggested 
that “the most straightforward and effective remedy” would be to issue an 
injunction prohibiting the State from denying the plaintiffs’ applications for 
marriage licenses solely because they were couples of the same sex.147 After 
all, that was the remedy which the trial court judge had awarded to the 
plaintiffs in Baehr.148
Judge Johnson somewhat disparagingly described the majority’s 
remedy as “little more than a declaration of rights.”
  
149 Furthermore, because 
the majority had suspended its declaratory judgment, she ultimately 
characterized the majority’s remedy as an “advisory opinion that leaves 
plaintiffs without redress and sends the matter to an uncertain fate in the 
Legislature.”150 She must have experienced mixed emotions a few months 
later when the Vermont legislature took action in a timely fashion but chose 
to create civil unions for same-sex couples, rather than granting them equal 
access to civil marriage.151
The Vermont Supreme Court was the first state high court to 
characterize the classification in an opposite-sex marriage statute as an 
implicit sexual orientation-based classification. The court based its 
description of the classification at issue upon its understanding that the 




 143. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 887. 
 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness. The court thus understood that 
the opposite-sex marriage statute would have the effect of preventing all 
lesbian and gay same-sex couples from marrying the life partners of their 
 144. Id. at 898 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
 145. Id. at 901.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 149. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 904. 
 150. Id. 
 151. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2000).  
 152. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 883 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
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choice. Unlike the Hawaii Supreme Court,153
By characterizing the classification at issue as a sexual orientation-
based classification, the Vermont Supreme Court also opened the door to the 
application of non-deferential, low-level scrutiny. As a result, the court 
became the first state high court to scrutinize the state’s justifications for its 
opposite-sex marriage statute (e.g., procreation and furthering the link 
between procreation and child-rearing) and to hold that the state had failed 
to carry its burden of justification because the means were not reasonably 
related to the ends. Nevertheless, the court found only a violation of the 
common benefits clause. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs 
needed no more by way of a remedy than a declaration that they were 
entitled to the same statutory benefits and protections as those that Vermont 
law afforded married opposite-sex couples. That holding set the stage for the 
Vermont legislature to create the unique institution of civil unions for same-
sex couples.  
 the Vermont Supreme Court 
did not focus on the language of gender that appeared on the face of the 
opposite-sex marriage statute. By describing the classification at issue as an 
implicit sexual orientation-based classification, the Vermont Supreme Court 
might have enhanced the public’s understanding of the basis for the 
plaintiffs’ claim to marriage equality, and without a doubt the court made it 
possible to ignore the intricacies of the equal application defense.  
Baker v. State represents a very significant step forward in the evolution 
of marriage equality for same-sex couples. At the same time, it is a case in 
which the court chose to focus exclusively on the common benefits clause 
challenge, which was in essence an equality claim. Consequently, the court 
was in a position to be able to hold that the plaintiffs were entitled to no 
more than the statutory benefits incident to marriage, and not to the full 
status of marriage.  
V.  GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH: EQUAL BENEFITS AND 
EQUAL STATUS 
The plaintiffs in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health154 were 
same-sex couples who had learned the lessons of Baker v. State.155 Their 
complaint asserted both a liberty claim and an equality claim under the state 
constitution of Massachusetts,156
 
 153. See generally Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
 and their complaint sought a declaratory 
judgment that “the exclusion of the [p]laintiff couples and other qualified 
same-sex couples from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social 
status of civil marriage, as well as the protections, benefits and obligations 
 154. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
 155. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864. 
 156. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950. 
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of marriage, violates Massachusetts law.”157
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, 
essential and inalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the 
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; . . . in fine, 
that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, 
color, creed or national origin.
 Specifically, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the State’s marriage law violated article I of the State’s 
constitution, which provides in relevant part:  
158
The word “sex” had been added to article I in 1976, when the people of 
Massachusetts had voted in favor of that State’s equal rights amendment.
  
159 
The relevant legislative history suggested that the equal rights amendment 
would have “no effect upon the allowance or denial of homosexual 
marriages.”160 Rather, it indicated that the amendment would address only 
those laws that treated persons of opposite sexes differently.161
The first question before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
was one of statutory interpretation. The legislation at issue set minimum 
qualifications for obtaining “a marriage license.”
 
162 The issue was whether 
the term “marriage” could be construed as permitting same-sex couples to 
marry. The court held that the “everyday meaning” of “marriage” is the 
“legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife.”163 Therefore, the 
court held that the undefined word “marriage” in the State’s marriage license 
statute could not be construed to permit same-sex couples to marry.164
The larger question before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
was whether the opposite-sex marriage statute violated the state constitution. 
Although the court had construed the statute so as to honor the traditional 
definition of marriage, the plurality emphasized that “history cannot and 




 157. Id.   
 The court observed that 
the constitutional issue might be analyzed in two ways: 1) Did the marriage 
statute deny the constitution’s guarantee of equality? 2) Did the 
 158. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (amended 1976) (as amended by article 106 of the amendments 
to the constitution of the commonwealth, which is referred to as the equal rights amendment).  
 159. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 992 (Cordy, J., dissenting). The equal rights amendment had 
first been approved by two constitutional conventions of the legislature. Id.  
 160. Id. at 993. 
 161. Id. 
 162. The text of the challenged marriage statute is summarized in the plurality opinion. Id. at 
951–52 (plurality opinion).  
 163. Id. at 952 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 986 (7th ed. 1999)).  
 164. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953.  
 165. Id. 
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constitutional guarantee of liberty secure to each of the plaintiffs the right to 
marry his or her “chosen partner”?166 The three-judge plurality considered 
both questions simultaneously, while the concurring judge collapsed them 
into a single question by asking whether the marriage statute contained a 
classification that burdened a fundamental right in violation of the state 
constitution’s guarantee of equality.167 The court pointed out that, in matters 
involving family law (such as interracial marriage), “the two constitutional 
concepts frequently overlap, as they do here,”168 thereby suggesting that the 
court understood the synergistic potential of considering liberty and equality 
simultaneously. The court also observed: “The Massachusetts Constitution 
is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the 
Federal Constitution; it may demand broader protection for fundamental 
rights; and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected 
spheres of private life.”169
In a single passage, the court described civil marriage, identified the 
issue in the case, and announced its holding:  
 
 Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment 
of two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; 
it brings stability to our society. For those who choose to marry, 
and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, 
financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal, 
financial, and social obligations. The question before us is whether, 
consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the 
Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations 
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who 
wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. The Massachusetts 
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It 
forbids the creation of second-class citizens. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . . 
 Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of 
civil marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive 
union with another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of 
membership in one of our community’s most rewarding and 
cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible with the 
constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and 
equality under law.170
 
 166. Id. 
 
 167. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).   
 168. Id. at 953 (plurality opinion).  
 169. Id. at 948–49.  
 170. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948–49.  
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Three judges dissented from the court’s bold holding. They would have 
found that marriage is a union between one man and one woman.171 Then 
they would have ruled that the marriage statute imposed “no restriction on 
the right of any plaintiff to enter into marriage” because “[e]ach is free to 
marry a willing person of the opposite sex.”172
The court’s definition of marriage (i.e., the exclusive commitment of 
two individuals to each other) reflects its understanding that the right to 
marry is a civil right, and that marriage is linked to the pursuit of happiness, 
rather than to procreation. The court’s statement of the issue is implicitly 
premised on the view that same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are 
similarly situated with regard to the institution of marriage (as defined by the 
court). And the court’s unprecedented holding extends to same-sex couples 
both the status and the benefits of marriage. By honoring the dignity and 
equality of all individuals and by forbidding the creation of second-class 
citizens, the court’s holding dramatically demonstrates the synergistic power 
of liberty and equality when they are analyzed as overlapping constitutional 
claims. 
  
By considering liberty and equality simultaneously, the court broke 
away from cases such as Baker v. Nelson173 and Baehr v. Lewin174
Even though the court initially discussed liberty and equality 
simultaneously, the court still had to consider liberty and equality separately 
in order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply. With regard to the due 
process claim, the court splintered. The concurring judge found that “the 
right to marry” (including the right to marry someone of the same sex) is a 
“fundamental right” subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause.
 that had 
rejected the liberty claim outright because same-sex couples do not fit the 
traditional definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman. 
And, by discussing equality and liberty simultaneously, the court broke 
away from cases such as Baker v. Nelson that had rejected the equality claim 
outright because same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex 
couples with regard to the ability to procreate. Finally, by considering liberty 
and equality simultaneously, the court parted company with cases such as 
Baker v. State that had extended to same-sex couples only the benefits of 
marriage, and not the status of marriage. 
175
 
 171. Id. at 975 n.3 (Spina, J., dissenting) (citing Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. (1 Tyng) 48 
(1810)).  
 Therefore, if he had considered the due process claim, he would 
have applied strict scrutiny. The three dissenting judges found that the “right 
 172. Id. at 975.  
 173. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).  
 174. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
 175. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970, 972–73 (Greaney, J., concurring).  
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to same-sex marriage” is not a fundamental right,176 and therefore, at best, 
they would have applied deferential low-level scrutiny.177
The three-judge plurality described the right to marry as the “right to 
marry the person of one’s choice,”
  
178 and it also said that marriage has long 
been termed a “civil right.”179 But then the plurality announced that it would 
subject the statute to low-level scrutiny,180 although it would be a form of 
low-level scrutiny that “is not ‘toothless.’”181 The plurality offered the 
following explanation for its decision not to apply heightened scrutiny: 
“Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not 
consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial 
scrutiny.”182
Turning to the equal protection claim, all of the members of the court 
agreed that the statute did not contain a facial sexual orientation-based 
classification.
 
183 But then the court once again splintered. The concurring 
judge, who rejected the equal application defense, found that the statute 
contained a facial sex-based classification.184 He would have been willing to 
apply strict scrutiny under the equal rights amendment, but he had to 
acknowledge that the voters who had approved the equal rights amendment 
in 1976 did not intend for it to have the effect of allowing or denying same-
sex marriage.185 Therefore, in the end, he took the position that the 
classification at issue ought to be subjected to strict scrutiny because it 
burdened a fundamental right.186
The three dissenting judges found that the classification was not a sex-
based classification since the statute applied to men and women “in precisely 
the same way.”
  
187 Rather, they took the position that the statute 
distinguished facially between opposite-sex couples (who could obtain a 
marriage license) and same-sex couples (who could not).188
 
 176. Id. at 990–91 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  
 Because the 
dissenting judges characterized this classification as non-suspect, they would 
 177. Id. at 982 (Sosman, J., dissenting), 991 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  
 178. Id. at 958 (plurality opinion).  
 179. Id. at 957.  
 180. Id. at 961.  
 181. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960 n.20.  
 182. Id. at 961.  
 183. Id. at 953 n.11 (plurality opinion), 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).  
 184. Id. at 971–72 (Greaney, J., concurring).  
 185. Id. at 974 n.6; see also supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 186. Id. at 974. 
 187. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).  
 188. Id. at 994 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
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have applied deferential low-level scrutiny.189
The plurality did not consider the question of whether the statute 
contained a sex-based classification. Instead, it agreed with the dissenting 
judges that the statute facially distinguished between same-sex couples and 
opposite-sex couples.
  
190 At this point in its analysis, however, the plurality 
parted company with the dissenters. The plurality suggested that the 
distinction between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples in effect 
classified on the basis of sexual orientation because it deprived an individual 
of access to the institution of marriage when his or her chosen partner was a 
person of the same sex.191 The plurality then announced that it would once 
again apply the type of low-level scrutiny that “is not ‘toothless.’”192 It 
offered the following explanation for its failure to consider whether “sexual 
orientation” is a “suspect” classification: “We have not previously 
considered whether ‘sexual orientation’ is a ‘suspect’ classification. Our 
resolution of this case does not require that inquiry here.”193
Since the plurality thought that both the liberty claim and the equality 
claim ought to be subjected to the type of low-level scrutiny that “is not 
‘toothless,’” the plurality put the burden on the defendant to prove that the 
classification in the statute bore a “reasonable relationship” to a legitimate 
objective.
 
194 This resembled the level of scrutiny that the Vermont Supreme 
Court had applied in Baker v. State. The defendant in Goodridge set forth 
three justifications,195
The first of the justifications was “providing a ‘favorable setting for 
procreation.’”
 but a majority of the court rejected them all.  
196 The trial court judge had endorsed this justification when 
granting the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment. The trial court 
judge had ruled that “the state’s interest in regulating marriage is based on 
the traditional concept that marriage’s primary purpose is procreation.”197 
The plurality said: “This is incorrect.”198
The plurality opinion went on to explain that the State’s civil marriage 
laws “do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married 
people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of 
  
 
 189. Id. at 993–94.  
 190. Id. at 953 n.11 (plurality opinion).  
 191. Id. at 958.  
 192. Id. at 960 n.20, 961.  
 193. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 n.21.  
 194. Id. at 968. The dissenters would have placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs. Id. at 
998 n.21 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  
 195. Id. at 961 (plurality opinion).  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.  
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creating a family.”199 Moreover, the plurality emphatically asserted that “it 
is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one 
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil 
marriage.”200 The plurality opinion observed that “[t]he ‘marriage is 
procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable difference between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that difference into the 
essence of legal marriage.”201 In so doing, the plurality thought that “the 
State’s action confer[red] an official stamp of approval on the destructive 
stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to 
opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.”202
The second of the justifications was “ensuring the optimal setting for 
child rearing.”
  
203 The plurality noted that the State’s first justification 
“shades imperceptibly into its second.”204 The plurality acknowledged that 
“[p]rotecting the welfare of children” is undoubtedly a legitimate 
objective.205 However, it took the position that restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples could not possibly further that objective, since same-
sex couples also raise children.206
Moreover, the State had not offered evidence to prove that forbidding 
marriage to same-sex couples would increase the number of opposite-sex 
couples who would want to marry and have children.
  
207 Therefore, there was 
no “reasonable relationship” between the State’s marriage statute and its 
“proffered goal” of protecting the “optimal setting for child rearing.”208 
Instead, the State’s marriage statute actually had the counterproductive 
effect of depriving the children of same-sex couples of the optimal setting 
for child-rearing.209 And the plurality could not comprehend how it could be 
considered rational “to penalize children by depriving them of State benefits 
because the State disapproves of their parents’ sexual orientation.”210
The third of the justifications was “preserving scarce State and private 
 
 
 199. Id. at 961. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 962.  
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 203. Id. at 961. 
 204. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962. 
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 206. Id. at 962–63. 
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financial resources.”211 Because the plurality was applying low-level 
scrutiny, it could not reject this asserted legitimate objective outright. 
Instead, it had to ask whether the means bore a reasonable relation to the 
end. The plurality noted that the State assumed that same-sex couples are 
more financially independent than opposite-sex couples, and therefore they 
are less in need of public marital benefits (such as tax advantages) or private 
marital benefits (such as employer-financed health insurance).212 But the 
plurality found that the State’s assumption was flawed because “many same-
sex couples, such as many of the plaintiffs in this case, have children and 
other dependents (here, aged parents) in their care.”213 Furthermore, the 
plurality observed that the State does not require opposite-sex couples to 
demonstrate their financial dependence in order to receive either public or 
private marital benefits.214 Rather, the State makes those benefits available 
to opposite-sex married couples “regardless of whether they mingle their 
finances or actually depend on each other for support.”215
After rejecting all three of the State’s justifications for the opposite-sex 
marriage statute, the court turned its attention to a final rationale that had 
been developed by several amici. They had asserted that “broadening civil 
marriage to include same-sex couples will trivialize or destroy the institution 
of marriage as it has historically been fashioned.”
  
216 The plurality 
acknowledged that its decision did significantly change the traditional 
definition of marriage, but it insisted that its decision would “not disturb the 
fundamental value of marriage in our society.”217 After all, “the plaintiffs 
[sought] only to be married, not to undermine the institution of civil 
marriage.”218
Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of the 
same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex 
marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to 
marry a person of a different race devalues the marriage of a 
person who marries someone of her own race.
 The plurality emphasized this point by drawing the following 
analogy:  
219
If anything, the plurality observed, “extending civil marriage to same-sex 
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couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and 
communities” because the fact that same-sex couples are “willing to 
embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and 
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage 
in our laws and in the human spirit.”220
The plurality’s discussion of the State’s justifications for the sexual 
orientation-based classification in the marriage statute in Goodridge was so 
extensive because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined 
the justifications stereoscopically through the lenses of both liberty and 
equality. By contrast, in Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court 
examined the State’s justifications solely through the lens of the common 
benefits clause.
   
221 As a result, the Vermont Supreme Court focused almost 
exclusively on the question of whether the statutory classification was either 
under-inclusive or over-inclusive.222
For example, the courts in both Baker v. State and Goodridge 
recognized that, if the state asserts that the justifications for an opposite-sex 
marriage statute are promoting procreation and protecting the welfare of 
children, then the legislative classification at issue is both under-inclusive 
and over-inclusive because it does not exclude opposite-sex couples who are 
unable to procreate naturally or who want to marry for reasons unrelated to 
procreation, and it does not include same-sex couples with children. But the 
plurality in Goodridge went beyond that line of analysis and focused on 
reframing the definition of civil marriage as well. It took the position that it 
is the “exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one 
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil 
marriage.”
 The plurality opinion in Goodridge 
paid attention to that issue, but it went beyond a consideration of that 
question as well.  
223
Having found that the State’s marriage statute failed to survive non-
deferential, low-level scrutiny, the plurality opinion in Goodridge 
considered the appropriate form of relief. It noted that, when a plaintiff 
makes an equal protection challenge, a court has two options: 1) strike the 
statute down; or 2) extend it to the plaintiffs.
 It then explained that, when the State defines and justifies 
marriage by reference to procreation, it is stigmatizing same-sex 
relationships by suggesting that they are inherently unstable. Thus, by 
looking at marriage through the lenses of both liberty and equality 
simultaneously, the plurality was able to reframe the definition of marriage 
so as to broaden the institution of civil marriage without destroying it.   
224
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Goodridge opted to extend the marriage statute to the plaintiffs.225
The plurality announced that it would construe civil marriage to mean 
“the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all 
others.”
  
226 It reasoned that reformulating the definition of marriage 
redressed the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury while advancing the State’s 
legitimate interests.227 The plurality noted that the plaintiffs had asked for a 
declaratory judgment that the State’s marriage license statute violated 
Massachusetts law, but they had not asked for an injunction ordering the 
State to issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs.228 Therefore, it declared that 
“barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil 
marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex 
violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”229 A majority of the court vacated 
the summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the case to the trial 
court for entry of judgment consistent with the plurality’s opinion.230 The 
court stayed the entry of judgment for “180 days to permit the Legislature to 
take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion.”231
When the legislature later requested an advisory opinion from the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as to whether the court would 
permit the legislature to create civil unions for same-sex couples, the answer 
was an emphatic “no.”
  
232 A majority of the court took the position that the 
proposed legislation violated both the due process clause and the equal 
protection clause of the state constitution.233 The two dissenting judges, who 
would have permitted civil unions, characterized the dispute before the court 
as a mere “squabble over the name to be used.”234
 
 225. Id. The concurring judge agreed with the remedy ordered by the plurality. Id. at 970 
(Greaney, J., concurring). 
 But the majority of the 
court characterized the proposed law as one that segregated same-sex unions 
from opposite-sex unions, and it adamantly asserted that “separate is seldom, 
 226. Id. at 969 (plurality opinion). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. at 969–70. 
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 232. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). More 
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 233. Id. at 572. The legislature apparently had construed the court’s stay as a signal that it could 
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 234. Id. at 572  (Sosman, J., dissenting). A third judge wrote a “separate opinion” in which he 
declined to consider the question posed by the legislature until after the legislature had completed its 
deliberative process. Id. at 580–81 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
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if ever, equal.”235
 We recognize that the pending bill palliates some of the 
financial and other concrete manifestations of the discrimination at 
issue in Goodridge. But the question the court considered in 
Goodridge was not only whether it was proper to withhold tangible 
benefits from same-sex couples, but also whether it was 
constitutional to create a separate class of citizens by status 
discrimination, and withhold from that class the right to participate 
in the institution of civil marriage along with its concomitant 
tangible and intangible protections, benefits, rights, and 
responsibilities. Maintaining a second-class citizen status for same-
sex couples by excluding them from the institution of civil 
marriage is the constitutional infirmity at issue.
 The majority of the court then explained why the proposed 
legislation violated both the principles of liberty and equality under the state 
constitution: 
236
Thus, the court’s advisory opinion, like its original opinion in Goodridge, 
illustrates the synergistic power of joining claims for liberty with claims for 
equality in marriage cases brought by same-sex couples.   
  
VI.  HERNANDEZ V. ROBLES: AFTER TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 
 Post-Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,237 plaintiffs in state 
court marriage equality cases suffered a string of losses.238 If Goodridge 
took two steps forward for marriage equality, then these cases took one step 
back. This Section will feature just one of the cases, Hernandez v. Robles,239
The plaintiffs in Hernandez were forty-four same-sex couples who 
hoped to persuade the New York Court of Appeals
 
on the theory that it is an excellent illustration of both the types of arguments 
that parties advanced and the types of opinions that courts handed down 
throughout this entire line of cases.  
240 to follow in the 
footsteps of Goodridge. Therefore, they challenged New York’s opposite-
sex marriage statute on the grounds that it denied them both liberty and 
equality under the state constitution.241
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power to construe the state constitution independently of the Federal 
Constitution, yet it also recognized that it usually looked first to the Federal 
Constitution for guidance.242 The court then noted that, in this case, it would 
not consider itself bound243 by the Supreme Court’s ruling without an 
opinion in Baker v. Nelson.244
With regard to due process, the plaintiffs claimed that each one of them 
had a fundamental right “to select and marry the person of his or her 
choice.”
   
245 The three-judge plurality acknowledged that “the right to marry 
is unquestionably a fundamental right,” but it immediately reformulated the 
issue, stating that the plaintiffs actually were claiming “[t]he right to marry 
someone of the same sex.”246 Not surprisingly, given its narrow definition of 
the right at issue, the plurality then found (in accord with Baehr v. Lewin247) 
that the right to same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right because it is 
not deeply rooted in tradition.248
Judge Graffeo, who wrote the concurring opinion, defined the term 
“marriage” in its traditional sense as a union of one woman and one man.
 
249 
She thereby linked marriage to procreation (in accord with Baehr). The 
plaintiffs suggested that the link between procreation and marriage had 
become “anachronistic because of scientific advances in assisted 
reproduction technology.”250 Judge Graffeo was not persuaded, saying that 
“the fact remains that the vast majority of children are conceived 
naturally.”251 Consequently, she found that the plaintiffs had no fundamental 
right to marry due to their inability to procreate.252
A majority of the Hernandez court thus completely rejected the 
Goodridge court’s reasoning that the right to marry is the civil right to marry 
a person of one’s choice. Instead, the court adopted the traditional definition 
of marriage (linking it to procreation) and indicated that it would apply very 
deferential low-level scrutiny to the opposite-sex marriage statute under the 
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itself bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. Nelson, 
nonetheless its opinion replicated the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in that early marriage equality case.254
The two dissenting judges, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Kaye, 
agreed with the plaintiffs that the right to due process of law includes the 
fundamental right to marry, and that central to the fundamental right to 
marry is “the right to marry the person of one’s choice.”
 
255 The dissent 
sharply criticized the plurality for recasting the plaintiffs’ claim as one for a 
“new” right to same-sex marriage because it demonstrated that the plurality 
did not understand that the plaintiffs sought access to the historically-
recognized institution of marriage, rather than access to a new institution.256 
The dissenting judges also criticized the concurring judge for defining 
marriage by reference to tradition and procreation, saying that “‘an argument 
that marriage is heterosexual because it “just is” amounts to circular 
reasoning.’”257
Finally, the dissenters took the position that “fundamental rights, once 
recognized, cannot be denied to particular groups on the ground that these 
groups have historically been denied those rights.”
  
258 Put another way, 
fundamental rights are not defined in terms of “who” is entitled to exercise 
them.259 Once a liberty interest has been identified as fundamental, it “must 
be afforded to all.”260 This is the first moment when the dissenting judges in 
Hernandez recognized the synergy between liberty and equality. 
Consequently, they took the position that the marriage statute ought to be 
subjected to strict scrutiny because it impinged on a fundamental liberty 
interest.261
With regard to equality, the plaintiffs claimed that the opposite-sex 
marriage statute should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because it 
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the theory that the statute was subject to the equal application defense.263 
They parted company, however, on the question of whether the statute 
contained a sexual orientation-based classification. They agreed that the 
statute did not “facially” prohibit either heterosexuals or homosexuals from 
marrying,264
The plurality found that the plaintiffs had put in sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of sexual 
orientation: “Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex 
and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not 
treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and 
benefits associated with marriage.”
 but they disagreed as to whether the statute in effect 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. 
265 The concurring judge (who concurred 
in the result only) took the position that, at best, the statute had only a 
disparate impact on gays and lesbians because those homosexuals who 
wanted to enter into an opposite-sex marriage were not barred from 
obtaining marriage licenses.266 She then emphasized the fact that the 
plaintiffs had failed to submit any evidence of what she perceived to be the 
requisite proof that the legislature had crafted the marriage statute “for the 
purpose of disadvantaging gays and lesbians.”267
Despite the disagreement between the plurality and the concurring 
judge regarding the nature of the classification, they actually were in total 
agreement regarding the applicable level of scrutiny. The plurality took the 
position that, generally speaking, no more than deferential rational basis 
scrutiny is appropriate under the equal protection clause when plaintiffs have 
“‘distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the 
authority to implement.’”
   
268 In this case, the plurality found that the 
plaintiffs’ “preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the 
birth of children is relevant to the State’s interest in fostering relationships 
that will serve children best.”269 In other words, the plaintiffs as same-sex 
couples were not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples. And the 
concurring judge was of the opinion that the plaintiffs deserved no more 
than deferential low-level scrutiny because they had failed to prove that the 
legislature passed the opposite-sex marriage statute for the purpose of 
disadvantaging gays and lesbians.270
 
 263. Id. at 10–11 (plurality opinion), 19–20 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
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The dissenting judges found both a sex-based classification and a sexual 
orientation-based classification. First, they said that the statute contained a 
facial, sex-based classification. They refused to recognize the equal 
application defense because they took the position that Loving v. Virginia271 
“expressly rejected” that defense.272
The dissenting judges also observed that the statute, in effect, imposed 
different treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. From their perspective, 
the statute excluded gay and lesbian couples from the institution of marriage 
“[s]olely because of their sexual orientation . . . —that is, because of who 
they love.”
  
273 The dissenters rejected the concurring judge’s theory that the 
statute had only a “disparate impact” on gays and lesbians. In the words of 
Chief Judge Kaye: “The purported ‘right’ of gays and lesbians to enter into 
marriages with different-sex partners to whom they have no innate attraction 
cannot possibly cure the constitutional violation actually at issue here.”274
This is the second moment when the dissenters in Hernandez 
recognized the synergy between liberty and equality. Citing to Perez v. 
Sharp,
  
275 they took the position that the right to marry is “‘the right of 
individuals, not of groups.’”276 Consequently, they concluded: “Limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples undeniably restricts gays and lesbians from 
marrying their chosen same-sex partners whom ‘to [them] may be 
irreplaceable’—and thus constitutes discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.”277
With regard to the applicable level of scrutiny, the dissenters found that 
the sex-based classification was a quasi-suspect classification that ordinarily 
would be subject to intermediate-level scrutiny.
 Because the dissenters had defined the right to marry as “the 
right to marry the person of one’s choice,” they understood that the 
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breaking finding that the sexual orientation-based classification was a 
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powerlessness).279 Yet, despite these findings, the dissenters said: “Although 
the classification challenged here should be analyzed using heightened 
scrutiny, it does not satisfy even rational-basis review, which requires that 
the classification ‘rationally further a legitimate state interest.’”280 Like the 
plurality in Goodridge, then, the dissenters opted to apply a form of low-
level scrutiny that was not toothless.281
Because the judges in Hernandez were applying two different forms of 
low-level scrutiny, they disagreed about how to state the issue in the case. In 
framing the issue under deferential low-level scrutiny, the concurring judge 
said: “[T]hese cases turn on whether the Legislature’s decision to confine the 
institution of marriage to couples composed of one woman and one man is 
rationally related to any legitimate state interest.”
 
282 By contrast, in framing 
the issue under non-deferential, low-level scrutiny, the dissenters said: 
“Correctly framed, the question before us is not whether the marriage 
statutes properly benefit those they are intended to benefit—any 
discriminatory classification does that—but whether there exists any 
legitimate basis for excluding those who are not covered by the law.”283 
Even more precisely, the dissenters said: “The relevant question here is . . . 
whether the State’s interests in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex 
marriages are rationally furthered by the exclusion.”284
The question of how to frame the issue under low-level scrutiny was so 
important in Hernandez because the defendant had articulated a justification 
for the State’s marriage statute that was designed to counteract the 
Goodridge court’s concern that the state’s justifications for opposite-sex 
marriage (e.g., providing a favorable setting for procreation) actually served 
to stigmatize same-sex couples and their children.
 
285 The defendant in 
Hernandez contended, and the plurality found, that the purpose of marriage 
is to promote responsible procreation.286 In other words, the plurality found 
that “the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, 
it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in 
opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships.”287
 
 279. Id. at 27–29.  
 The plurality based its 
reasoning on the fact that, in the case of same-sex couples, parenthood is 
necessarily intended, while in the case of opposite-sex couples, parenthood 
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may be the result of “accident or impulse.”288 Consequently, as the plurality 
opinion concluded: “The Legislature could find that unstable relationships 
between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children 
will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-
sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships 
will help children more.”289
If the promotion of stability in opposite-sex relationships is a legitimate 
state objective, then (in the language of the concurring judge) it “is not 
irrational for the Legislature to provide an incentive for opposite-sex 
couples—for whom children may be conceived from casual, even 
momentary intimate relationships—to marry, create a family environment, 
and support their children.”
 
290 Judge Graffeo recognized that “many same-
sex couples share these family objectives and are competently raising 
children in a stable environment.”291 But she found that, because most same-
sex couples rely on assisted reproduction and adoption processes to have 
children, they simply are “not similarly situated” to opposite-sex couples 
with regard to the primary purpose of marriage, which is the promotion of 
responsible procreation.292
The dissenting judges acknowledged that the State has a legitimate 
interest in encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before they have 
children.
 
293 But, given the way in which the dissenters had framed the issue, 
they found that “the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage in no 
way furthers this interest.”294 As Chief Judge Kaye pithily observed: “There 
are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.”295
In addition to considering the newly-minted argument that marriage 
promotes responsible procreation, the majority of the court and the 
dissenters in Hernandez all considered the long-standing argument that the 
definition of marriage is linked to procreation and the rearing of children. 
And they all recognized that the opposite-sex marriage classification is both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive
 
296 for the reasons first articulated by the 
court in Baker v. State.297
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language of the concurring opinion) pointed out that “under rational basis 
review, the classification need not be perfectly precise or narrowly 
tailored.”298 Rather, “all that is required is a reasonable connection between 
the classification and the interest at issue.”299 A majority of the court held 
that the marriage statute met that test.300
The dissenters, by contrast, found that “no one rationally decides to 
have children because gays and lesbians are excluded from marriage.”
  
301 
They suggested alternative means to the end of promoting procreation, such 
as tax breaks to couples with children, subsidizing child care for those 
couples, and mandating generous family leave for parents.302 The dissenters 
also found that tradition could not in itself be a rational basis for the 
challenged exclusion because “the justification of ‘tradition’ does not 
explain the classification; it merely repeats it.”303
Hernandez is one of several state high court cases that explicitly 
rejected the court’s reasoning in Goodridge.
 
304 The New York Court of 
Appeals, like all of the other courts in this line of cases, took one huge step 
back. It refused to recognize any synergy whatsoever between liberty and 
equality, thereby replicating the reasoning of such state cases as Baker v. 
Nelson305 (even though it did not consider itself bound by the Supreme 
Court decision in Baker v. Nelson306). In applying very deferential low-level 
scrutiny and upholding the marriage statute, the court recognized not only 
the State’s long-standing “marriage as procreation” argument, but also its 
newly-minted “responsible procreation” argument. Chief Judge Kaye, 
writing for the dissenters, closed her opinion with the following words: “I 
am confident that future generations will look back on today’s decision as an 
unfortunate misstep.”307
VII.  IN RE MARRIAGE CASES: FULL RECOGNITION OF THE SYNERGY 
BETWEEN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 
  
The same-sex couples who filed consolidated complaints challenging 
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the State’s opposite-sex marriage statutes in In re Marriage Cases308 (the 
California Marriage Cases) asserted both a liberty claim and an equality 
claim under the state constitution,309 hoping that the California Supreme 
Court would recognize the potential synergy between the two claims. The 
text of the state constitution provides: “A person may not be deprived of . . . 
liberty . . . without due process of law or denied equal protection of the 
laws.”310 The state constitution also explicitly provides that the rights 
guaranteed by the state constitution “are not dependent on those guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution.”311
California already had enacted comprehensive domestic partnership 
legislation, extending to same-sex couples virtually all of the benefits and 
imposing on them virtually all of the legal obligations that California law 
afforded to and imposed on married couples.
  
312 The question, therefore, was 
“whether, under these circumstances, the failure to designate the official 
relationship of same-sex couples as marriage violates the California 
Constitution.”313 The plaintiffs were asking the court to extend the 
designation (or name) of marriage to same-sex couples.314
Chief Justice George wrote the majority opinion, and he turned first to 
the due process issue to determine whether the plaintiffs could successfully 
claim a fundamental liberty interest in the right to marry. All of the parties 




The defendants took the position that the plaintiffs were invoking a 
right to same-sex marriage.
 They disagreed, however, as to the nature of the right that the 
plaintiffs were claiming.  
316 The plaintiffs responded that they were 
invoking the civil right “‘to join in marriage with the person of one’s 
choice.’”317 That was the due process right which was first recognized in 
Perez v. Sharp,318
 
 308. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  
 the 1948 California Supreme Court decision striking 
 309. Id. at 403 (describing the same-sex couples who were among the several parties to the 
consolidated cases). 
 310. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.  
 311. Id. § 24.  
 312. The domestic partnership legislation is described by the court. In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 397–98.  
 313. Id. at 398.  
 314. Id. at 452–53. 
 315. Id. at 419 (noting that past California cases establish “beyond question” that the right to 
marry is a “fundamental right”).  
 316. Id. at 420. 
 317. Id. (quoting Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948)) (emphasis added in In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384). 
 318. Perez, 198 P.2d 17.  
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down the State’s anti-miscegenation statute. The plaintiffs noted that the 
court in Perez did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge on the 
ground that there was no due process right to interracial marriage.319 Instead, 
Perez extended the fundamental right to marry to interracial couples.320
The majority of the court agreed that the plaintiffs were not seeking to 
create a “new” constitutional right. Nor were they trying to “change” the 
existing institution of marriage.
  
321 Rather, they were contending that, 
“properly interpreted, the state constitutional right to marry affords same-sex 
couples the same rights and benefits—accompanied by the same mutual 
responsibilities and obligations—as this constitutional right affords to 
opposite-sex couples.”322
Two of the dissenting judges took the position that the plaintiffs were 
indeed claiming “a new right to same-sex marriage.”
 
323 Not surprisingly, 
they found that there is no deeply rooted tradition of same-sex marriage.324 
The third dissenting judge said: “What is unique about this case is that 
plaintiffs seek both to join the institution of marriage and at the same time to 
alter its definition.”325 She opined that the people are entitled to preserve the 
traditional name of marriage for opposite-sex couples.326
Because the majority of the court found that the plaintiffs were claiming 
a state constitutional right to marry the person of one’s choice, the majority 
proceeded to examine the substantive content of the right. In an 
unprecedented opinion, the court held that the right was not merely a 
“negative” right, insulating a couple from interference by the State, but also 
a “‘positive’ right to have the state take . . . affirmative action to 
acknowledge and support the family unit.”
 
327 More specifically, the court 
said that the “positive” right to marry obligates the State “to take affirmative 
action to grant official, public recognition to the couple’s relationship as a 
family.”328
 In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights 
embodied in the right to marry—and their central importance to an 
 The court then concluded:  
 
 319. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 420. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 421. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 462 (Baxter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
 324. Id.   
 325. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 469 (Corrigan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part).  
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 426. The court could cite only to law review articles in support of its unprecedented 
view that the constitutional right to marry encompasses a “positive” right. Id. at 427 n.43. 
 328. Id. at 427.  
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individual’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying 
life as a full member of society—the California Constitution 
properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all 
individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual 
orientation.329
This is the first moment of the full recognition of the synergy between 
liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. Because the court was 
looking at the right to marry through the lenses of both liberty and equality, 
just as the court had done in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
  
330 it 
characterized the state constitutional right to marry as a “civil right” to 
marry the person of one’s choice.331 It emphasized that the right to marry “is 
often of crucial significance to the individual’s happiness and well-
being.”332 And then it extended the right to marry to all, regardless of sexual 
orientation.333 The court refused to let history and tradition define 
marriage.334 It also refused to link marriage to either procreation335 or 
responsible procreation,336 thereby adopting the reasoning of Chief Judge 
Kaye’s dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles.337
Chief Justice George then moved to the central question in the case: 
whether the failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples 
as “marriage” violated the state constitution’s due process clause. The 
Attorney General asserted that no one has a constitutional right to the name 
of marriage, and that the State could assign a name other than marriage 
(such as registered domestic partnership or civil union) to all couples.
   
338
 
 329. Id. 
 The 
majority responded by saying:  
 330. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 331. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 427.  
 332. Id. at 424. 
 333. Id. at 429, 432.  
 334. Id. at 430. 
 335. Id. at 430–32. More specifically, the court said: “The personal enrichment afforded by the 
right to marry may be obtained by a couple whether or not they choose to have children, and the 
right to marry never has been limited to those who plan or desire to have children.” Id. at 432. 
 336. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431–33. More specifically, the court said:  
None of the past cases discussing the right to marry . . . contains any suggestion that 
the constitutional right to marry is possessed only by individuals who are at risk of 
producing children accidentally, or implies that this constitutional right is not equally 
important for and guaranteed to responsible individuals who can be counted on to take 
appropriate precautions in planning for parenthood. 
Id. at 432. 
 337. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); see supra notes 293–95, 301–03 and 
accompanying text.  
 338. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 434. 
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 Whether or not the name “marriage,” in the abstract, is 
considered a core element of the state constitutional right to marry, 
one of the core elements of this fundamental right is the right of 
same-sex couples to have their official family relationship 
accorded the same dignity, respect, and stature as that accorded to 
all other officially recognized family relationships.339
The court then held that, because the state was denying the name “marriage” 
to same-sex couples while granting that “historic and highly respected” 
name to opposite-sex couples, the state was “potentially impinging upon the 




This is the second moment of the full recognition of the synergy 
between liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. The court was 
faced with the question of whether the name “marriage” is part of the 
constitutional right to marry under the due process clause. It answered the 
question by reference to principles of equality. It found that one of the core 
elements of the constitutional right to marry is the right to have one’s official 
family relationship accorded equal dignity and respect.  
   
With regard to the equal protection clause, the plaintiffs claimed that 
the opposite-sex marriage statutes should be subjected to strict scrutiny 
because they contained either a sex-based classification or a sexual 
orientation-based classification.341 The dissenting judges would have held 
that it was unnecessary to consider how to characterize the classification at 
issue because same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex 
couples for purposes of marriage.342 The court disagreed, finding that same-
sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples because “[b]oth 
groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to enter into a 
formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family 
relationship.”343
This is the third moment of the full recognition of the synergy between 
liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. The court had 
characterized the constitutional right to marry as the right to marry the 
person of one’s choice. It had refused to link marriage to either procreation 
or responsible procreation. Instead, it had linked marriage to happiness. 
Moreover, the court had defined the constitutional right to marry as the right 
to have one’s official family relationship accorded equal dignity and respect. 
Therefore, the court was in a position to rule that same-sex couples are 
  
 
 339. Id.  
 340. Id. at 434–35.  
 341. Id. at 436. 
 342. Id. at 464 (Baxter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), 470 (Corrigan, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
 343. Id. at 435 n.54.  
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similarly situated to opposite-sex couples for purposes of marriage.  
The majority held that the opposite-sex marriage statutes contained a 
facial sex-based classification, but that the classification was subject to the 
equal application defense.344 It distinguished Perez and Loving v. Virginia345 
on the ground that both cases involved facial racial classifications where 
there was evidence of a legislative purpose to maintain white supremacy.346 
It also observed that most of the prior state court marriage equality cases had 
come to the same conclusion.347
The majority next considered whether the opposite-sex marriage 
statutes contained a sexual orientation-based classification. The court 
acknowledged that there was no facial sexual orientation-based 
classification.
 
348 Then it said: “In our view, the statutory provisions 
restricting marriage to a man and a woman cannot be understood as having 
merely a disparate impact on gay persons, but instead properly must be 
viewed as directly classifying and prescribing distinct treatment on the basis 
of sexual orientation.”349
This is the fourth moment of the full recognition of the synergy between 
liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. Because the court had 
defined marriage as the civil right to marry the person of one’s choice, it 
understood that gays and lesbians would want to marry someone of the same 
sex. A statute restricting marriage to persons of opposite sexes would place 
marriage “outside the reach of couples of the same sex,” thereby 
unquestionably treating them differently from opposite-sex couples on the 
basis of sexual orientation.
  
350
The court then turned to the question of the applicable level of scrutiny 
for sexual orientation-based classifications. The issue was whether to apply 
low-level scrutiny or strict scrutiny. The court came to the unprecedented 
conclusion that sexual orientation is a suspect classification subject to strict 
scrutiny (based on proof of the history of discrimination, the ability of gays 
and lesbians to perform or contribute to society, and their historical political 
powerlessness).
   
351
The final issue under the equal protection clause was whether the 
marriage statutes impinged upon a “fundamental, constitutionally protected 
 
 
 344. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 436. 
 345. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 346. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437. 
 347. Id. at 438 n.57. 
 348. Id. at 440. 
 349. Id. at 441.  
 350. Id. 
 351. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441–44. The court did not consider whether sexual 
orientation is a quasi-suspect classification because the California courts recognize only two tiers of 
scrutiny under the state’s equal protection clause. Id. at 435–36. 
 The Synergistic Evolution of Liberty and Equality 315 
privacy interest.”352 The court found that, by restricting same-sex couples to 
the separate institution of domestic partnerships, and by denying them access 
to marriage, the legislature had impinged upon the right of same-sex couples 
to have their family relationships accorded equal respect and dignity.353 The 
distinction in nomenclature was a “mark of second-class citizenship.”354
When the court applied strict scrutiny to the opposite-sex marriage 
statutes, it held that they violated the state constitution.
 For 
this additional reason, the court held that the marriage statutes ought to be 
subject to strict scrutiny under the fundamental interest strand of the equal 
protection clause. This is the fifth moment of the full recognition of the 
synergy between liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. The 
court’s opinion demonstrates that the fundamental interest strand of equal 
protection analysis is a particularly effective theory for examining an issue 
stereoscopically.  
355 The Attorney 
General chose to focus his attention exclusively on the justification of 
tradition, stating that “marriage continues to apply only to a relationship 
between opposite-sex couples in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
in the United States and around the world.”356 The court agreed with Chief 
Judge Kaye that this limitation on marriage was not necessary to preserve 
the rights and benefits of marriage traditionally enjoyed by opposite-sex 
couples: “There are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.”357 
Moreover, the court found that excluding same-sex couples from marriage 
inflicts a “real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples and their 
children.”358 Consequently, when the court turned to a consideration of what 
would be an appropriate remedy, the court chose to extend the designation of 
marriage to same-sex couples.359
 
 352. Id. at 444–45. 
 
 353. Id. at 445. 
 354. Id.  
 355. Id. at 452. 
 356. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450–51. 
 357. Id. at 451 (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., 
dissenting)).  
 358. Id. at 452. 
 359. Id. at 452–53. In another case holding that a legislative designation of an alternative status 
for same-sex couples (civil unions) was unconstitutional, the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed 
with the California Supreme Court regarding the appropriate remedy. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 480 (Conn. 2008) (“[T]he traditional definition of marriage . . . must be 
expanded to include [same-sex] couples.”). In November of 2008, the people of California passed 
Proposition 8, which added the following language to the California Constitution: “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008). 
The California Supreme Court upheld the validity of Proposition 8 on the theory that it was “a 
permissible constitutional amendment (rather than an impermissible constitutional revision).” 
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). On the other hand, the court ruled that Proposition 8 
would not apply retroactively to void any of the marriages validly entered into before the passage of 
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The California Supreme Court was the first state high court to hold that 
the right to marry is a fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny not only 
under the due process clause, but also under the fundamental interest strand 
of the equal protection clause. Additionally, it was the first state high court 
to hold that a sexual orientation-based classification is a suspect 
classification that must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause. The court was able to formulate these unprecedented 
holdings because it fully recognized the synergy between liberty and 
equality.  
VIII.  VARNUM V. BRIEN: BUILDING ON THE FULL RECOGNITION OF THE 
SYNERGY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 
The six same-sex couples who filed a complaint in Varnum v. Brien360 
challenged Iowa’s opposite-sex marriage statute after the Polk County 
recorder (Timothy Brien) refused to issue marriage licenses to them.361 They 
asserted both due process and equal protection claims under the state 
constitution.362 The Iowa Supreme Court observed that generally it views 
“the federal and state equal protection clauses as identical in scope, import, 
and purpose.”363 At the same time, the court noted that “we have jealously 
guarded our right to ‘employ a different analytical framework’ under the 
state equal protection clause as well as to independently apply the federally 
formulated principles.”364 By way of example, the court cited to a long line 
of Iowa Supreme Court cases going back to 1839 in which the court had 
recognized the constitutional rights of slaves, racial minorities, and women 
years before the United States Supreme Court had recognized comparable 
rights under the Federal Constitution.365
In Varnum, the Iowa Supreme Court issued the first unanimous opinion 
in a marriage equality case, with Justice Cady writing for the court. It is an 
elegant opinion which builds upon the California Supreme Court’s full 
recognition of the synergy between liberty and equality. Justice Cady opened 
his opinion with a quotation from the state motto: “Our liberties we prize 




Proposition 8. Id. Propostion 8 is now being challenged in federal court under the Federal 
Constitution. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV09-2292 (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/legal-filings/plaintiffs-filed-complaint/. 
 He observed that the “primary 
 360. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 361. Id. at 872.  
 362. Id. at 873.  
 363. Id. at 878 n.6. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. at 877.  
 366. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872 n.1. 
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constitutional principle at the heart of this case is the doctrine of equal 
protection,”367 and he found it unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs’ other 
claims.368 Nevertheless, his discussion of equal protection is infused with 
references to the fundamental right to marry, as defined by the California 
Supreme Court.369
Justice Cady opened his discussion of the equal protection issue by 
stating: “This issue comes to us with the same importance as our landmark 
cases of the past.”
 Therefore, although his opinion initially appears to be 
based exclusively on the state constitution’s equal protection clause, 
nevertheless, it is an exquisite example of an opinion that fully recognizes 
the synergy between liberty and equality. 
370 Next, he observed that the same-sex marriage debate 
before the court was “part of a strong national dialogue centered on a 
fundamental, deep-seated, traditional institution that has excluded, by state 
action, a particular class of Iowans.”371 Finally, he set forth the specific 
equal protection issue in the case: “How can a state premised on the 
constitutional principle of equal protection justify exclusion of a class of 
Iowans from civil marriage?”372
The court first considered the threshold issue under the State’s equal 
protection clause—whether the plaintiffs were similarly situated to opposite-
sex couples. The defendant sought to undermine the plaintiffs’ equal 
protection claim by asserting that the plaintiffs “are not similarly situated to 
opposite-sex couples . . . because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate 
naturally.’”
  
373 Put another way, the defendant argued that the statute treated 
dissimilar persons differently. In response, the court explained that, when 
analyzing the similarly situated issue, it would not “simply look at the trait 
used by the legislature to define a classification under a statute and conclude 
that a person without that trait is not similarly situated to persons with the 
trait.”374 Since all members of any class are similarly situated in this respect, 
the court observed that “‘any classification whatsoever would be reasonable 
by this test.’”375
 
 367. Id. at 876. 
 Instead, the court held that “the equal protection guarantee 
requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with respect to 
 368. Id. at 906 n.32. 
 369. Id. at 878, 882–84. 
 370. Id. at 878. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 878. 
 373. Id. at 882. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. (quoting Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CAL. L. REV. 341, 345 (1949)). 
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the purposes of the law alike.”376
The court then explained that the plaintiffs were in “committed and 
loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual couples,” 
thereby emphasizing the fact that one of the reasons for marriage is to 
promote “comfort and happiness.”
  
377 Moreover, the court found that 
officially recognizing their status would provide “an institutional basis for 
defining their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it 
does for heterosexual couples.”378 In short, the court concluded that, for 
purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, “which are designed to bring a sense of 
order to the legal relationships of committed couples and their families in 
myriad ways,” the plaintiffs were “similarly situated in every important 
respect, but for their sexual orientation.”379
This is the first moment when the court recognized the synergy between 
liberty and equality in Varnum. It found that procreation is not the sine qua 
non of marriage. Instead, it found that marriage is intended to promote the 
comfort and happiness of committed couples and to bring order and stability 
to their relational rights and responsibilities as well as to their families. 
Consequently, the court concluded that same-sex couples are similarly 
situated to opposite-sex couples with respect to the purposes of marriage. 
 Therefore, the court refused to 
recognize the defendant’s threshold challenge to the application of the equal 
protection clause.  
The next issue before the Iowa Supreme Court was the nature of the 
classification. The court below had held that the opposite-sex marriage 
statute classified on the basis of sex, but Justice Cady took the position that 
the statute actually classified on the basis of sexual orientation.380 He 
recognized that the statute did not contain a facial sexual orientation-based 
classification.381 Nevertheless, he rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
statute had only a disparate impact upon gay and lesbian people.382 Instead, 
he characterized the statute as containing an implicit sexual orientation-
based classification that resulted in disparate treatment.383
Justice Cady explained his position by describing the plaintiffs as 





 376. Id. at 883. 
 He then observed that, when “[v]iewed in the complete context 
 377. Id. (quoting Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984)). 
 378. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883. 
 379. Id. at 883–84. 
 380. Id. at 884. 
 381. Id. at 885. 
 382. Id.  
 383. Id. 
 384. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872. 
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of marriage, including intimacy, civil marriage with a person of the opposite 
sex is as unappealing to a gay or lesbian person as civil marriage with a 
person of the same sex is to a heterosexual.”385 Thus, he concluded, “the 
right of a gay or lesbian person under the marriage statute to enter into a 
civil marriage only with a person of the opposite sex is no right at all.”386 
Instead, a gay or lesbian person can only gain the same rights under the 
statute as a heterosexual “by negating the very trait that defines gay and 
lesbian people as a class—their sexual orientation,” meaning that the statute 
“differentiates implicitly” on the basis of sexual orientation.387
This is the second moment when the Iowa Supreme Court recognized 
the synergy between liberty and equality in Varnum. Because the court had 
found that marriage is intended to promote the comfort and happiness of 
committed couples, and because it understood that gay and lesbian persons 
are sexually and romantically attracted to members of their own sex, the 
court realized that a gay or lesbian person would not want to marry a person 
of the opposite sex. Therefore, it ruled that the classification at issue was in 
effect a sexual orientation-based classification.  
 
The court then turned to the question of the applicable level of scrutiny 
for sexual orientation-based classifications. It took the position that such 
classifications are quasi-suspect classifications subject to intermediate 
scrutiny (based on the history of discrimination, the ability of gays and 
lesbians to contribute to society, the immutability of sexual orientation, and 
the historical political powerlessness of gay and lesbian people).388 When 
the court applied heightened scrutiny, it found that the statute violated the 
equal protection clause because it was both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive for all of the reasons first set forth by the court in Baker v. State.389
Finally, Justice Cady considered the appropriate remedy, noting that 
courts in other jurisdictions either had allowed the state legislature to create 
an alternative status for same-sex couples or had extended marriage to 
them.
  
390 The court refused to authorize the Iowa legislature to create an 
alternative status (such as civil unions), stating: “This record, our own 
independent research, and the appropriate equal protection analysis do not 
suggest the existence of a justification for such a legislative classification 
that substantially furthers any governmental objective.”391
 
 385. Id. at 885. 
 Consequently, the 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 886–87, 897. The Iowa Supreme Court utilizes “the traditional” three-tiered analysis 
under the state constitution’s equal protection clause. Id. at 896 n.23. 
 389. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 900–02; see also supra 
notes 125–37 and accompanying text.  
 390. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 906–07.  
 391. Id. 
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court held that “the language in [the Iowa marriage statute] limiting civil 
marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken from the statute, and the 
remaining statutory language must be interpreted and applied in a manner 
allowing gay and lesbian people full access to the institution of civil 
marriage.”392
Because the court throughout its opinion had examined the equal 
protection challenge stereoscopically through the lenses of liberty and 
equality, it understood when it came to the remedial phase of the case that 
the plaintiffs were entitled to both the status of marriage and the statutory 
benefits of marriage. The plaintiffs could not be treated as second-class 
citizens by confining them to an alternative status, such as civil unions. 
Instead, they were entitled to an inclusive remedy that would afford them 
full access to the institution of civil marriage.  
  
IX.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined selected marriage cases brought by same-sex 
couples in state courts under state constitutions in order to understand the 
role played by liberty and equality in this one segment of gay rights 
litigation. It is the thesis of this Article that, when gay rights litigators and 
state courts have considered the two constitutional claims independently of 
each other, neither claim standing alone has been strong enough to provide a 
basis for extending the institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples. But, 
when gay rights litigators and state courts have focused on both claims 
simultaneously, looking at the institution of marriage stereoscopically, the 
synergistic effect of the interplay between the two claims gradually has 
enabled the courts to rethink the fundamental question of whether marriage 
is an exclusive institution for opposite-sex couples only. In some of the cases 
under review, after the courts have looked at the institution of marriage 
through the lenses of liberty and equality simultaneously, they have come to 
the twin conclusions that the state’s opposite-sex marriage statute is 
unconstitutional and that same-sex couples must have full access to the 
institution of civil marriage. These are the decisions that represent the 
culmination of the synergistic evolution of liberty and equality in the state 
court marriage cases to date. They are also the decisions that may provide a 
model for state and federal court marriage litigation in the future. 
 
 
 392. Id. at 907. 
